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Will Todman 
 
This paper argues that the Syrian regime’s authoritarian nature 
has affected the choice of the siege as a tactic of counter-insur-
gency. The first section traces the evolution of urban locales as 
sites for the practice of war, and explores the geographies of 
counter-insurgency tactics, the justification for collective pun-
ishment, and the concept of ‘urbicide’. The tactics employed by 
the Syrian regime are examined in light of the history of counter-
insurgency and urban warfare in Syria in the twentieth century. 
The evolution of the Syrian regime’s military doctrine is ex-
plored in order to show how it came to include siege tactics, 
which were first deployed in Hama in 1982 when Hafez al-Assad 
quashed the Islamist rebellion. Finally, the paper explores the 
imposition of sieges since April 2011, looking at how various 
armed groups employed sieges to achieve their military objec-
tives. Two area case studies are given to illustrate the differences 
in military tactics between urban and rural sieges - the sieges of 
Yarmouk Camp and the Eastern Ghouta. The paper shows how 
siege tactics allowed the Syrian regime to isolate and contain 
sources of rebellion, and prevent them from spreading to key ar-
eas of strategic importance. Thus, siege tactics were one of the 
factors that contributed to the Syrian regime’s ability to survive 
during the current conflict, even when various analysts predicted 
its imminent fall. 
 
Introduction 
In December, 2016, convoys of green buses carried tens of thou-
sands of civilians and opposition fighters out of the remaining 
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rebel-held areas of Aleppo. The regime’s brutal campaign to re-
take Aleppo mirrored the tactics it used two years earlier to re-
capture the city of Homs, once considered the capital of the 
Syrian revolution. In both instances, suffocating sieges forced 
the opposition forces to submit.  
 A siege is enforced by erecting checkpoints at strategic ac-
cess points to a target area, thereby taking control of the area’s 
supply-lines. Its primary aim is to force a restive population into 
submission by cutting off its access to food and other goods in-
dispensable to its survival.  
 On April 25, 2011, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) deployed 
its first siege in the current conflict. After seven weeks of unrest, 
the SAA surrounded and laid siege to the southern city of Dera’a 
as part of a ten-day military operation that would leave over 500 
Syrians dead, and 2,500 detained.1 Following this initial use of 
siege tactics, the regime then began imposing longer-term partial 
sieges in rural Damascus in 2012, limiting the entry and exit of 
civilians and goods. The first instance of opposition forces be-
sieging a pro-government area came in July 2012 when fighters 
from the Free Syrian Army (FSA) surrounded Nubul and Zahraa, 
two Alawi-majority towns in rural Aleppo. In the spring of 2013, 
the regime intensified its sieges in rural Damascus, preventing 
all goods from reaching many areas, and subjecting the besieged 
populations to aerial bombardment and shelling.2  
 In November 2016, the U.N. Under-Secretary-General for 
Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Ste-
phen O’Brien, estimated that 974,080 people were living under 
siege in Syria, nearly doubling the estimate from six months ear-
lier.3 This revised figure brought the estimate closer to that of 
the monitoring group, Siege Watch, which has long argued that 
over a million Syrians live under siege.4  Opposition armed 
groups, and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), impose 
sieges that trap many thousands of Syrians. The vast majority, 
however, live under siege of the regime. 
 This paper will examine why the Syrian regime adopted 
sieges by exploring the urbanisation of modern warfare and 
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counter-insurgency. Beyond the relevant academic literature, the 
research draws upon interviews with 21 diplomatic and human-
itarian officials, as well as survey responses completed by 16 in-
habitants of various besieged areas in Syria, collected from 
Beirut during the summer of 2015. The identities and affiliations 
of these individuals are not included to ensure their confidenti-
ality and safety.  
 Arguing that Syria’s status as an authoritarian state affects 
the choice of counter-insurgency tactics, the first section will 
trace the evolution of urban locales as sites for the practice of 
war, and explore the geographies of counter-insurgency tactics, 
the justification of collective punishment, and the concept of 
‘urbicide’.5 The second section will examine the tactics em-
ployed by the Syrian regime during the current conflict in light 
of the history of counter-insurgency and urban warfare in Syria 
in the twentieth century. The evolution of the Syrian regime’s 
military doctrine is explored in order to show how it came to 
include siege tactics, first deployed in Hama in 1982 when Hafez 
al-Assad quashed the Islamist rebellion. The final section of the 
paper will explore the imposition of sieges since April 2011, 
looking at how armed groups employed siege warfare to achieve 
their military objectives. I will illustrate the differences in mili-
tary tactics between urban and rural sieges by looking at the 
sieges of Yarmouk Camp in Damascus, and the Eastern Ghouta 
in rural Damascus. This paper will explain how adopting siege 
tactics allowed the Syrian regime to isolate and contain sources 
of rebellion and prevent them from spreading to key areas of 
strategic importance. Thus, siege tactics were one of the factors 
that contributed to the Syrian regime’s ability to survive during 
the current conflict, even when various analysts predicted its im-
minent fall. 
 
Counter-insurgency and the changing location of war  
The Syrian regime’s tactics were a crucial element of its ability 
to survive even as it suffered from increasing military defections, 
dwindling finances, and growing international condemnation. I 
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propose that the regime considered the early stages of the con-
flict to be a counter-insurgency, and this explains various ele-
ments of its response to the uprising, including the use of siege 
tactics. When sieges were first imposed on restive areas of the 
country, the asymmetric military capabilities of the conflicting 
parties, and the guerrilla tactics the rebels employed, both cor-
roborate this point of view. An insurgency is defined in modern 
times as:  
[A]n organized movement that aims at overthrowing the 
political order within a given territory, using a combina-
tion of subversion, terrorism, guerrilla warfare and propa-
ganda.6 
Counter-insurgency, then, refers to the tactics that a government 
or occupying power employs to put down an insurgency. Laleh 
Khalili provides a useful differentiation between “enemy-cen-
tric” and “population-centric” counter-insurgency tactics.7 Pop-
ulation-centric counter-insurgency involves attempts by the 
government or occupying power to provide security, protection, 
and services to populations living in the areas wherein insurgents 
operate. Enemy-centric counter-insurgency, on the other hand, 
aims to undermine insurgents’ support by imposing punitive 
measures on the entire population living in insurgents’ zones of 
operation, be they militants or civilians. Examining the impact 
of regime type on choice of counter-insurgency tactics, David 
Ucko argues that authoritarian regimes are more likely to adopt 
brutal enemy-centric tactics in a way that “punishes the people 
for the insurgency and severs the bonds between the two not 
through politics but with force.”8 Authoritarian regimes are able 
to adopt such methods because they are not constrained by law, 
are uncontested by rivals, and can often control the flow of in-
formation available to their citizens through the state-owned 
press.9 Thus, for an authoritarian regime, the focus of counter-
insurgency is not on winning ‘hearts and minds’, but rather on 
“selling the threat to the broader populace, surging support for 
both party and state, and whipping up a chauvinistic hatred for 
the perfidious rebels that justifies whatever response is deemed 
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necessary.”10 This paper will focus on these facets of enemy-
centric counter-insurgency tactics, which the Syrian regime has 
overwhelmingly favoured during the current conflict.  
 
The emergence of modern urban warfare 
The dramatic rate of global urbanisation over the last few centu-
ries has had a profound effect on the nature and setting of war-
fare. Throughout history, while the city has remained the critical 
site of militarized power and control, the site of armed conflicts 
has shifted.11 In pre-modern and early-modern times, cities were 
both the primary agents and targets of war, and great efforts were 
expended on sacking and capturing cities of strategic im-
portance, often by employing sieges.12 The European nation-
states that emerged during the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries directed the violence, control, and repression of colonial 
conquest from cities, however the cities themselves were no 
longer the primary site of conflict. Instead, colonial expansion-
ism transferred the site of violence to rural areas as colonial 
states quashed rural insurrections in order to exploit the land to 
sustain the cities. However, with the coming of the industrial 
age, cities became crucial vehicles for providing states with suf-
ficient manpower and military technology to sustain massive 
wars. As a result, once again, cities became the target of state-
led armed conflict, with bombing campaigns moving from the 
“selective destruction of key sites within cities” to “attacks on 
urban areas” in their entirety.13 
 Twentieth-century urbanisation coincided with major 
global developments including increasing social polarization 
and inequality, violent political and economic structural adjust-
ments, the heightening salience of ethnic and fundamentalist re-
ligious identities, and the growing scarcity of many essential 
resources.14 This rapid urbanisation brought these new tensions 
into the urban sphere and resulted in an “implosion of global and 
national politics into the urban world.”15 As a result, many of the 
conflicts arising from these tensions have occurred in urban 
spaces, and thus, bloody urban insurgencies have proliferated. 
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The geographies of counter-insurgency 
Insurgencies create new spatial possibilities for violence. Unlike 
the conventional warfare of the past, insurgencies are not con-
strained by linear movement, but rather operate indeterminably, 
exploiting the ability to exist in multiple spatial and temporal 
points in a seemingly random manner.16 This unpredictability 
has proven an effective means of subverting a state’s traditional 
authority, and helps explain why insurgency-tactics have arisen 
so frequently in recent history. To combat these new geographic 
vulnerabilities, counter-insurgencies often seek to reshape space 
as a way of re-exerting their authority.  
 During the French occupation of Syria, the French Troupes 
du Levant were forced to alter their military tactics in response 
to rebel insurgency. French forces traditionally used military 
column formations to march through areas and command the 
obedience of native populations. As the rebels exploited the new 
spatial opportunities insurgency-tactics afforded them, attacking 
the French sporadically and then swiftly retreating, the occupy-
ing forces attempted to reshape Syria’s physical geography in 
such a way as to restore their military advantage over rebel 
groups.17 As would be the case once again nearly a century later, 
one of the most important insurgencies operated in the Ghouta, 
the rural farmlands surrounding Damascus, after rebel groups 
failed to take the Syrian capital in October 1925. The Troupes 
du Levant’s military columns were ineffective in quashing the 
insurgents there, as the rebel groups could flee oncoming col-
umns, hide in the rural landscape, and then re-form to strike in a 
non-linear, random fashion.18 Initially unable to encircle such a 
wide area, the French employed an ‘inverted siege’ on Damascus 
to ensure that the rebels couldn’t enter the city.19 This tactic in-
volved the construction of 12 miles of new boulevards and 
barbed wire fences around the capital.20 After the landscape had 
been altered to ensure that the rebels could not penetrate the city, 
the French positioned some 9,000 troops around the Ghouta and 
swept through, forcing the rebel groups out to the North. This 
method of restricting movement to deal with insurgency in the 
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rural Ghouta, as we shall see, shares parallels with how the Syr-
ian regime has attempted to quash rebellion in that region during 
the current conflict.  
 In urban settings too, counter-insurgency operations seek to 
reshape space to their advantage, and this often includes con-
structing physical barriers, such as walls. Geographical parti-
tions often have the effect of solidifying boundaries between 
different population categories, be they ethnicities, communi-
ties, or nations.21 Walls have been constructed as a tactic of 
counter-insurgency in many modern conflicts including in 
Northern Ireland, by the U.S. army in Iraq, and by Israel in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories. The new spatial realities that 
emerge enable increased military control by curtailing the envi-
ronments in which rebels can operate. These new geographies 
have the effect of turning entire populations of urban spaces into 
objects of “study, warfare, and manipulation” as the traditional 
separation between military and civilian targets is blurred.22 To 
justify this, armed actors employ Manichaean, dichotomised 
rhetorical constructions of ‘us’ and an othered ‘them’, in a way 
that renders all human subjects living in an urban environment 
legitimate targets, being seen as real or potential fighters, terror-
ists, or insurgents.23 Sieges also aim to curtail the space in which 
insurgents can operate, affecting entire populations, and the Syr-
ian regime has employed rhetoric to justify such tactics. 
 
Counter-insurgency and collective punishment 
Many aspects of this new military doctrine of counter-insur-
gency equate to collective punishment. Although collective pun-
ishment was historically accepted as a necessary element of 
warfare, the 1899 Hague Conventions broke this tradition and 
forbade collective punishment, stating: “[n]o general penalty, 
pecuniary or otherwise, can be inflicted upon the population on 
account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be re-
garded as jointly and severally responsible”.24 The 1949 Geneva 
Conventions expanded upon these provisions, stating that “[n]o 
protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has 
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not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all 
measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.”25  
 However, despite these provisions, governments and occu-
pying powers have frequently employed measures which equate 
to collective punishment. Unable to locate insurgents responsi-
ble for hostile acts, powers have used collective punishment in 
an attempt to reduce violence and enforce obedience.26 Histori-
cally, collective punishment included preventing food and other 
supplies from reaching a restive area. In Malaya, British colonial 
forces prevented the sale of anything but precooked rice to vil-
lages believed to be harbouring insurgents. Field Marshal Gerald 
Templer even ordered a reduction of rice rations as a punitive 
measure, following certain insurgent attacks.27 More recently, 
throughout Operation Vigilant Resolve during the U.S. occupa-
tion of Iraq in 2004, U.S. forces allowed just three of sixty vehi-
cles carrying relief supplies, food, and medicine into Fallujah as 
part of their counter-insurgency operations.28 This blockade was 
designed to force an end to the support of insurgents by down-
grading the living conditions of all of the city’s inhabitants. In 
2015, a UN OCHA study asserted that the Israeli and Egyptian 
blockade on the Gaza Strip had undermined the living conditions 
of its 2 million inhabitants, saying “[the] restrictions have re-
duced access to livelihoods, essential services, and housing, dis-
rupted family life, and undermined the people’s hopes for a 
secure and prosperous future.”29  
 Given technological advances in the modern day, govern-
ments and occupying powers have increasingly sought to destroy 
the means of modern urban life in a systematic manner, a tactic 
known as ‘urbicide’. Employed as a facet of counter-insurgency, 
urbicide targets the modern infrastructure upon which urban 
populations rely, including systems of electricity, communica-
tions, water, sanitation, and transportation.30 Tactics of urbicide 
aim to render a city uninhabitable, forcing the residents into sub-
mission by turning daily life into a “massive struggle against 
darkness, cold, immobility, hunger, isolation, fear of crime and 
violence, and a catastrophic and rapid degeneration in public 
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health.”31 Other forms of urbicide reshape the physical geogra-
phy of a city to assert the complete dominance of a power over 
its enemy.  
 War mobilizes a charged dialectic of attachment to place: 
the idea that ‘our’ places are the antithesis of those of the de-
monized enemy.32 In counter-insurgencies, therefore, the very 
physicality of cities is also rendered a legitimate target of vio-
lence, wherein entire neighbourhoods are razed to the ground in 
retaliation for having harboured insurgents. Given that tactics of 
urbicide do not discriminate between armed fighters and civil-
ians, they constitute a form of collective punishment.  
 The 1982 Hama uprising provides one of the first examples 
of institutionalized urbicide, in which Hafez al-Assad used urbi-
cide as a tactic of counter-insurgency. Following the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s calls for Hama’s population to rise up against As-
sad’s regime in 1982, the regime carefully employed rhetoric in 
a way that would mobilize society for a brutal campaign of coun-
ter-insurgency. Patrick Seale described Hafez al-Assad as hav-
ing turned from a recluse into an orator “able to set large 
audiences alight and to do so night after night” with his fiery 
speeches.33 Two divisions of the SAA, the 3rd Armoured Divi-
sion under the command of General Shafiq Fayyad, and the De-
fence Brigades under the command of Rifaat al-Assad, joined 
forces to quash the rebellion. These loyal divisions were joined 
by pro-regime paramilitary forces which had been carefully re-
cruited and armed by the regime.34 Rifaat al-Assad employed 
rhetoric that was consistent with collective punishment, stating 
“those who are not with the regime must now be considered 
against it.”35  
The assault began with several days of street battles, but af-
ter this proved insufficient, a high-intensity siege was imposed, 
and indiscriminate shelling destroyed whole neighbourhoods of 
the city.36 Following this assault, army bulldozers were sent to 
flatten the smoking shells of buildings, allowing ground troops 
to advance, but also wiping the sites of rebellion from Hama’s 
geography.37 Tens of thousands of the city’s fleeing inhabitants 
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were arrested at the security ring the regime forces had im-
posed.38 Estimates of the dead range from 10,000 to 40,000.39  
 
Syrian military doctrine 
Understanding why and how such brutal measures of counter-
insurgency entered into the SAA’s military doctrine, as exempli-
fied in Hama, is key to explaining the use of sieges in the current 
conflict. Following the defeat of Arab armies in the Six-Day War 
of 1967, the Soviet Union took the opportunity to dramatically 
increase its military relations with various Arab armies, includ-
ing with the SAA. As part of this process, Soviet military advi-
sors were placed in every Syrian military training facility, air and 
naval base, maintenance depot, and even in every single squad-
ron of the SAA.40 The SAA also sent significant numbers of its 
officers to the Soviet Union for military training.41 To a greater 
extent than other Arab countries with military relationships with 
the Soviet Union, the Syrian military adopted the Red Army’s 
organisation, tactics and operations.42  
 The Soviet Union adopted siege tactics resembling those 
employed in rural areas of Syria today when fighting Ukrainian 
separatists in the 1940s and 1950s, establishing outposts and 
checkpoints on all the roads and trails that connected villages 
thought to be harbouring insurgents, thus cutting off their access 
to provisions and critical supplies.43 However, until the occupa-
tion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Soviet Union had little experi-
ence in counter-insurgency, and had not developed a nuanced 
military doctrine capable of responding to such threats.44 As a 
result, the Soviet Union relied on a tactic in Afghanistan that had 
previously proven successful, and which exploited an advantage 
it maintained over mujahedeen – overpowering military force 
through its superior artillery.45 In Herat, a city central to urban 
guerrillas, the Soviets engaged in such extensive shelling that 
three-quarters of the urban centre was reduced to rubble.46 Rifaat 
al-Assad, one of the key commanders in the Hama offensive, 
trained at the Soviet Yekaterinberg Artillery Academy, and it 
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was there that he likely learned such tactics. Thus, it seems prob-
able that the tactic adopted by the SAA of overwhelmingly rely-
ing upon tank artillery fire in the operations against the 
insurgents in Hama was a product of Soviet military doctrine.47 
Russia has honed its doctrine of counter-insurgency through its 
involvement in other conflicts. During the second Chechnyan 
war in the late 1990s, the Russian military combined the heavy 
bombardment that had characterised many of its previous mili-
tary operations with a military and economic blockade designed 
to choke any external support.48   The military relationship 
between Russia and Syria so evident today has a long history. 
Given that reports of Russian military advisors embedded with 
the SAA surfaced early in the current conflict, it seems probable 
that Russian military doctrine has had an impact on the tactics 
employed in recent years by the SAA.49 However, it is also im-
portant to remember that many of the same Syrian military of-
ficers who played a role in the 1982 Hama offensive retain roles 
in the SAA today. While Rifaat al-Assad and Shafiq Fayyad 
were respectively exiled from Syria and retired from the SAA in 
1995, younger officers who participated in the Hama offensive 
remain in the SAA.50  
 In the intervening period between the Syrian regime’s bru-
tal crackdown in 1982, and March 2011, opponents of the gov-
ernment suffered from torture, detention, and long prison 
sentences, but the regime has not attempted military operations 
of the same scale.51 This implies that the Syrian military’s tactics 
of quashing rebellion in Hama were highly successful, and so it 
is logical that the regime would look to siege tactics as a proven 
means of putting down rebellion. Having witnessed the toppling 
of Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, and Egyptian 
president Hosni Mubarak, the Syrian regime’s response was also 
based on the premise that they did not repress the popular pro-
tests quickly enough. The following section will explore how 
and why the Syrian regime employed tactics of counter-insur-
gency during the current conflict. 
 
12    An Exploration of Impact: Hunger, Cartoons & Philosophy 
The use of sieges in the current conflict 
During the early stages of the uprising that erupted in Dera’a in 
March 2011, the Syrian regime employed rhetoric in a manner 
typical of Ucko’s model of authoritarian counter-insurgency. In 
his national address on 30th March 2011, President Bashar al-
Assad argued that Syria was “facing a great conspiracy” at the 
hands of “imperial forces” who were supported by foreigners 
and media groups.52 This rhetoric reflects the established tactic 
of counter-insurgency, to create divisions between those ‘inside’ 
and ‘outside’ of the nation.53 Until late March 2011, all protests 
were depicted as a “decisive threat”.54 However, in subsequent 
speeches in early April, as it became clear that the protests were 
not dying down, and due to external pressure, Assad changed 
tack and proposed limited political reforms, acknowledging the 
presence of some protestors with legitimate demands.55 When 
this too failed to quell the protests, once again Assad differenti-
ated between groups of people. In a speech at Damascus Univer-
sity on June 20, 2011, he argued that there were three different 
categories of people involved in the unrest in his country: those 
with legitimate concerns; outlaws; and takfiri extremists who 
tried to “sneak into Syria”. This rhetoric represented another at-
tempt to paint all dissenters as foreigners or criminals, distin-
guishing between ‘Syrians’ and “saboteurs”.56  
 Military operations conducted by Syrian authorities to 
quash the growing insurgency mirrored the broad dichotomy be-
tween those who were with the regime and those who were 
against it, and whole geographical areas were categorised as be-
ing one or the other, making no attempt to distinguish between 
legitimate protestors and those allegedly involved in violence.57 
The SAA’s military operations were all-encompassing and un-
forgiving, constituting collective punishment in a way similar to 
Hama in 1982.58 Having failed to prevent protestors from con-
tinually taking to the streets chanting anti-regime slogans by fir-
ing upon them, the Syrian military opted to deploy all-out 
military force in a way that would reduce the spatial possibilities 
for insurgency. The first siege was imposed on the city of Dera’a.  
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 On April 25, 2011, the army surrounded Dera’a, cut water 
and electricity supplies, shelled the city, and prevented the entry 
of humanitarian aid to the besieged population by either aid 
agencies or civilians.59 Security forces opened fire on residents 
who attempted to leave their houses in search of food or medi-
cine for the wounded during the 11-day siege.60 The SAA would 
replicate this pattern in many sites of unrest across the country 
in their attempt to quash the uprising. The official rhetorical jus-
tification for the high levels of violence was that by promising 
reforms, Assad had removed the grounds for continued demon-
strations.61 On April 16, Assad had declared “with these laws, 
we draw a line between reform and sabotage.”62 
 The Syrian military considered the first siege in Dera’a to 
be successful, withdrawing on May 5, 2011. Sieges were also 
imposed on Douma, Zabadani, Baniyas, and the Bab al-Seba’a 
and Baba Amr areas of Homs city between April 25 and May 6, 
2011. These sieges aimed to restrict the geographical possibili-
ties of insurgents’ attacks by hermetically sealing populated ar-
eas thought to be harbouring fighters, preventing their escape. 
Checkpoints were erected at strategic points of entry to the en-
circled urban areas, and snipers often covered areas in between, 
shooting all those attempting to escape.63 Restrictions on move-
ment were combined with artillery shelling, although at this 
early stage in the conflict, it did not specifically target the infra-
structure required for urban life, as is common with tactics of 
urbicide. Rather, these attacks seem to have constituted a com-
mon tactic of authoritarian counter-insurgency, seeking to ter-
rorise the besieged populations in hope of turning them against 
the rebels and thus preventing rebel mobilisation.64 The initial 
tactic of besieging restive areas was intended to be a short-term 
military tactic, using enemy-centric methods of counter-insur-
gency including violence and terror to force populations to with-
draw perceived support for armed insurgents. However, as these 
tactics proved insufficient to control areas of rebellion, the SAA 
shifted to a systematic campaign of destroying vital sites of ci-
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vilian infrastructure in a way that would force besieged popula-
tions to surrender by starving them. Investigating how siege tac-
tics were deployed in specific areas helps explain how the 
regime protected its grip over Damascus, which was crucial to 
its hold on power. The regime first employed tactics of urbicide 
in a besieged area in the southern suburbs of Damascus, in Yar-
mouk Camp.  
 
An urban siege – the siege of Yarmouk, Damascus  
The Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp lies in Damascus’ south-
ern suburbs, and had a population of approximately 800,000 be-
fore the beginning of the current Syrian conflict, consisting of 
roughly 150,000 Palestinians and 650,000 Syrians.65 Remem-
bering the September 1982 massacres in Sabra and Shatila in 
Beirut and the mass expulsions of Palestinians from Kuwait dur-
ing the 1991 Gulf War, the vast majority of Palestinians in Syria 
were determined to remain neutral during the Syrian uprising.66 
However, after the increasing arming of protestors in the sum-
mer of 2011, and the entry of regime forces to al-Ramel Pales-
tinian camp near Latakia in August, some Palestinians inside 
Yarmouk increased contact with the FSA. The regime was 
acutely aware of Yarmouk’s potential as a site of opposition ac-
tivity, as its strategic location made it a possible launch-pad from 
which rebels could advance into central Damascus, with supply 
lines available through the rural lands to the south of the camp.67 
Despite the majority of the camp residents’ attempts to maintain 
a neutral stance in the conflict, armed opposition groups infil-
trated the camp in the winter of 2012. Following this, Yarmouk 
became a target of sustained regime attacks.68  
 In August 2012, the SAA shelled the camp for the first time, 
reportedly killing 21 civilians.69 In December of the same year, 
hostilities reached a climax, and a battle between armed opposi-
tion groups and pro-government forces erupted. In an important 
escalation in the conflict, on December 16, 2012, Syrian jets 
were used for the first time to bomb densely populated areas of 
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the camp.70 The regime claimed this was a mistake, but indis-
criminate bombing was to become a common feature of the 
SAA’s counter-insurgency tactics, especially as continued de-
fections and mounting casualties stretched the regime’s forces.  
 After this incident, when more extreme Islamist factions, 
including Jabhat al-Nusra, stormed the camp, the SAA attempted 
to besiege Yarmouk, but supply lines from the south of the camp 
sporadically allowed in limited goods, meaning the siege was 
incomplete. By July 2013, the scarcity of goods, shelling, aerial 
bombardment, and the radicalisation of armed factions operating 
within Yarmouk, had motivated an estimated 85 percent of the 
camp’s population to flee.71 On July 15, 2013, the Syrian regime 
then imposed one of the most brutal sieges of the conflict to 
date.72 
 Systematically destroying the infrastructure upon which the 
camps’ residents relied, including water, sanitation and electric-
ity networks, the SAA prevented the movement of all people and 
goods in and out of the camp until April 2014.73 During this time, 
humanitarian conditions deteriorated to become some of the 
worst in the whole conflict. Amnesty International estimates that 
at least 194 civilians died, 128 by starvation, and others due to a 
lack of adequate medical care or sniping while foraging for 
food.74 In early 2014, the camp’s residents broke into an aban-
doned spice factory and survived for months from boiling weeds, 
spices, and water into a kind of broth, drinking just one cup a 
day.75 A number of residents reported having eaten nothing more 
than this for many weeks at a time.76 In October 2013, a fatwa 
was issued by Salah al-Khatib, Imam of Yarmouk’s largest 
mosque, lifting religious restrictions on eating cats and dogs in a 
desperate attempt to prevent people from starving to death.77  
 Beyond malnutrition, as a result of the tactics of urbicide 
the medical situation deteriorated with the destruction of the 
camp’s infrastructure. With no electricity networks and severely 
limited fuel supplies, residents of Yarmouk resorted to burning 
wood salvaged from destroyed buildings and the Syrian Ameri-
can Medical Society (SAMS) cites smoke inhalation as the cause 
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of death for a resident of Yarmouk.78 Severe shortages in medi-
cal supplies and the inability to operate medical equipment due 
to a lack of electricity led to fatalities from easily-treatable med-
ical problems. For example, several women died during child-
birth.79 As levels of sanitation have further deteriorated, 
communicable diseases have proliferated. After months of fears 
of the spread of typhoid in the camp, UNRWA detected as many 
as 90 cases among those residents of Yarmouk who were able to 
exit the camp to UNRWA mobile health units in the neighbour-
ing area of Yalda in September 2015.80 The Syrian regime has 
attempted to justify the blockade on basic medical supplies, in-
cluding bandages and baby formula, on the basis that they could 
be used to treat wounded opposition fighters.81 
 Because of the difficulties in getting basic goods into the 
camp during the most severe times of the siege, prices of basic 
food items increased exponentially, as seen in the table below 
(figures given in Syrian pounds and U.S. dollars to control for 
the inflation of the Syrian pound).  
 
Figure 1: Comparison of prices of staple goods in Yarmouk before the 
siege to when they reached their height during the siege, based on au-
thor’s data collected from residents of the camp 
Food 
item 
February 2011 
Prices (pre-
siege) 
April 2014 
Prices Increase  
SYP USD SYP USD 
Rice (1 
kg) 
80 1.68 10,000  67 40x 
Sugar (1 
kg) 
90 1.89 11,000 73.7 39x 
Flour (1 
kg) 
50 1.05 9,000 60.3 57x 
Bread 
(1.5 kg) 
15 0.32 1,000 6.7 21x 
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 The siege of Yarmouk represented a decisive evolution in 
the government’s use of siege tactics, as it was the first example 
of systematic urbicide during the current conflict. Rather than 
surrounding the area with armed forces and restricting the entry 
of goods alone, the regime’s fear of an attack on Damascus from 
Yarmouk led it to combine these tactics with targeted airstrikes, 
shelling, and a comprehensive seal on the area in an attempt to 
starve the camp’s residents and render continued life inside the 
camp impossible. This tactic has proved successful, as it cur-
tailed the ability of armed opposition groups to operate outside 
the camp, and prevented any major attack on the city centre. 
However, the regime was not able to establish such an intense 
siege on rural areas in which armed groups operated, such as the 
Eastern Ghouta, which also presented a threat to the regime’s 
grip on Damascus. 
 
A rural siege: the siege of Douma, the Eastern Ghouta 
Just as the rural farmlands of the Eastern Ghouta had once be-
come a centre of dissent against French occupation, with rebel 
groups able to conduct ambushes and then escape with relative 
impunity, the Eastern Ghouta also became a major site of armed 
opposition against the regime in the current conflict, with groups 
exploiting the geographical opportunities for insurgency pro-
vided by the rural landscape. Mirroring the tactics employed by 
the French in 1925, the SAA’s first major move against the op-
position groups in December 2011 was to cut off the town of 
Douma, the administrative capital of the Eastern Ghouta, from 
Damascus. Unlike the relationship between the inhabitants of 
Aleppo and its surrounding rural lands, many of which are 
marked by animosity, there were strong ties between Damascus 
and the Eastern Ghouta.82 Some of these networks were based 
on industry and land tenure, as many individuals living in Da-
mascus owned rural land to the east of the city. As such, the re-
gime feared the spread of opposition from the Eastern Ghouta 
into the capital, and so cut transportation links between the two 
areas.83 
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 By the end of 2012, after a prolonged period of fighting, 
large areas of the Eastern Ghouta had fallen under the control of 
an array of 16 different armed opposition groups.84 Unlike the 
urban Yarmouk camp, which could be surrounded and cut off 
with comparative ease, the rural lands of the Eastern Ghouta 
proved much more difficult to isolate, hence the proliferation of 
the various armed groups in the area. In 2013, leaders and civil 
servants from Douma who had defected from the regime created 
a local council that provided some services autonomously from 
the regime, including street cleaning, and the issuance of birth 
and death certificates.85 At the time, Douma represented one of 
the only credible attempts for opposition factions to establish an 
alternative administrative system to that of the regime, and it be-
came a military and administrative centre for the opposition-held 
areas of the Eastern Ghouta. Determined to destroy this rival ad-
ministration, but lacking the resources to launch a full-scale at-
tack into the area, the SAA established a full siege around the 
whole of the Eastern Ghouta in October 2013, mirroring the sec-
ond stage of the occupying French forces’ counter-insurgency 
operations against rebels in the area. A number of towns and vil-
lages fell inside the siege, including Harasta, Douma, Adra, Al-
Marj, Saqba, Maliha, Irbin, and Kafr Batna.86 The SAA enforced 
the siege by establishing a number of checkpoints at strategic 
entry points around the perimeter of the area, with snipers cov-
ering the farmland in between, in which they also planted 
mines.87 
 The siege that ensued destroyed much of the infrastructure 
in Douma, delivering a critical blow to opposition factions’ abil-
ity to use it as an administrative centre, and making Doumanis’ 
primary concern “simply avoiding death and finding food and 
shelter.”88 In June 2015, residents of Douma reported that the 
only water extracted from wells by hand pumps was available, 
and generators provided a maximum of two hours of electricity 
a day. In February 2015, local councils made the decision to re-
strict school hours, only opening early in the mornings “before 
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air strikes begin.”89 In addition to almost daily shelling and air-
strikes on civilian areas, an infamous Sarin chemical attack on 
21st August 2013 is considered to be one of the most serious hu-
man rights abuses during the Syrian conflict, killing hundreds of 
civilians.90 Although the regime denied responsibility for the at-
tack and a UN investigation was careful not to apportion blame 
for the attack, a report conducted by Human Rights Watch came 
to the conclusion that Syrian government forces were “almost 
certainly responsible.”91 
Unlike the urban siege of Yarmouk, the presence of agricul-
tural lands inside the besieged area of the Eastern Ghouta pro-
duced dynamics that rendered the nature of the siege distinct 
from those the SAA had hitherto imposed in urban areas. Firstly, 
the farmland inside the siege provided a limited source of food 
for the besieged population. While limited access to water and 
the lack of diesel to power agricultural equipment meant that ag-
ricultural output was severely damaged, farmers continued to 
cultivate crops and orchards in an attempt to provide food for the 
besieged market.92 However, airstrikes frequently bombed crops 
during or just before the harvest period, showing that even in the 
case of rural sieges, starvation remained a key aim of the SAA’s 
siege tactics.93 An UN official who entered Douma as part of an 
aid convoy described the besieged population as “skeletons 
floating in their clothes”.94 
 As with Yarmouk Camp, the medical situation in the be-
sieged areas of the Eastern Ghouta became dire. After regime 
strikes destroyed the electricity, water, and sanitation networks 
in the winter of 2012-13, residents resorted to irrigating agricul-
tural lands with sewage-contaminated water, which the Syrian 
Arab Red Crescent (SARC) linked to the outbreak of typhoid in 
August 2014.95 SAMS staff operating in the Eastern Ghouta es-
timated that even with bribes, the amount of medical supplies 
that they could smuggle in amounted to less than 5 percent of 
what was needed.96 As with the siege of Yarmouk, many people 
living in Douma and the wider Eastern Ghouta area have died as 
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a direct result of the conditions brought about by the siege. Dur-
ing the period between October 21, 2012 and January 31, 2013 
alone, SAMS collected evidence of at least 208 civilians in the 
Eastern Ghouta having died from malnutrition or lack of access 
to medical care. 
 Besieging the Eastern Ghouta served two principal pur-
poses in terms of the regime’s problems with manpower. Firstly, 
planting mines around the besieged area and manning the check-
points was a means of isolating the area with limited man-
power.97 Secondly, the siege of the Eastern Ghouta was one of 
the first instances in which the regime exploited the conditions 
of the siege to conscript young males into the army.98 The regime 
detained and forcibly conscripted some of these young men at 
checkpoints, but for others, unemployment, the dire humanitar-
ian conditions, and the continued military attacks led them to the 
conclusion that joining the SAA was the only means of escaping 
the situation.99 Therefore, siege tactics not only helped the re-
gime to operate with limited manpower, but were also a means 
of remedying these problems, as conscription is a common fea-
ture across various sieges. 
 
Conclusion 
Because the Syrian regime is authoritarian, its counter-insur-
gency campaign has not been subject to many of the constraints 
that affect other governments. In a comparable manner to au-
thoritarian counter-insurgencies elsewhere, the Syrian regime 
has utilized indiscriminate violence and countered this with nar-
ratives that sought to mobilise the Syrian population against 
those deemed to be foreign insurgents. Seen as a tried-and-tested 
tactic of counter-insurgency after Hafez al-Assad brutally 
quashed the Islamist insurgency in Hama in 1982, sieges were 
imposed early in the conflict across the country, in an attempt to 
repeat this past success. When the insurgency evolved into civil 
war in 2012, and as the SAA became increasingly over-
stretched, sieges proved an even more effective tactic for the re-
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gime, as they required limited manpower, and provided oppor-
tunities for conscripting civilians into the army. Sieges also al-
lowed the regime to utilise the military advantage provided by 
its air-force. Air attacks intensified the sieges, transforming the 
military blockades into a systematic campaign of urbicide in an 
attempt to render life in the besieged areas entirely unfeasible. 
 Siege warfare, therefore, is a military tactic that helps ex-
plain the longevity of the conflict in Syria. The Syrian regime’s 
tactics of counter-insurgency were instrumental in its strategy of 
protecting certain key strongholds, and sieges were a central el-
ement of this strategy. As we have seen, whenever a threat to 
Damascus emerged, such as in Yarmouk camp or in the Eastern 
Ghouta, the regime employed sieges to isolate the centres of re-
bellion and cut them off from external support, thus staving off 
the threat to the city. This logic also explains the prolonged siege 
the regime imposed on the city of Homs, which occupies a stra-
tegic location in between Damascus and Aleppo, and on the cor-
ridor from the capital to the Mediterranean coast, and the 2016 
siege of Aleppo city.100 Controlling these key cities was crucial 
for the regime to maintain the legitimacy it was afforded by pre-
senting itself as the sole actor capable of providing stability and 
services to the Syrian people, which explains its continuing sup-
port from a segment of Syrian society. 
However, given the severe humanitarian conditions and ex-
treme levels of destruction that sieges cause, it may seem sur-
prising that many sieges failed to force the besieged populations 
to surrender, and instead have endured for many years. Some 
scholars, including Stathis Kalyvas, have argued that indiscrim-
inate violence is often counter-productive, and that it actually 
provokes rather than dissuades insurgent violence.101 However, 
a more significant motivation for the longevity of sieges has 
been the emergence of new networks of profiteering in the war 
economy. The Syrian regime has failed, either through negli-
gence or necessity, to stop the spread of corruption within the 
SAA, and the prevalence of the practice of bribery. All 16 re-
spondents to my surveys from besieged areas noted that regime 
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soldiers allowed certain goods into the besieged areas if they 
were bribed enough, and this helps explain why many sieges en-
dured for years and failed to achieve their military objectives.102  
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